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DEVELOPMENT AS A HUMAN RITE
Paul H. Brietzke
Human rights today function as a kind of Rorschach test: optimists
see a fundamentally new international order evolving from recent
initiatives,1 while pessimists see only the international anarchy of
the Amins and the Pol Pots:2
There is little enthusiasm in the Western world at
the moment for discussions about human rights.
The very words induce a stifled yawn. Realpolitik
is the order of the day. [W]hen the Americans
announce that they intend to resume arms sales to
Guatemala, many people might be surprised to hear
that such sales had ever stopped.3
Even the most cheerfully optimistic are hard put to discover progress
in the area of development, beyond the achievements of a few small
communities. The first Brandt Commission Report and its calls for a New
International Economic Order left little more than a trace on the
thinking of its intended audience.4 The theoretical ("Club of Rome")
limits to growth, reenforced by OPEC and the recessionary mismanagement
of the international economy, have provoked an international
"free-for-all on the limits to eouity."5 Thus, the putting together of
development, human rights, and the New International Economic Order was a
stroke of ideological genius. The creators of the right to development
offer a core around which the nobler aspirations inthe Third World can
coalesce to shame the First and Second Worlds. But their inrovaticn is
not without its risks; instead of drawing strength from each other, the
shaky concepts of human rights, development, and the NIEO may collapse
upon each other.6
B , collapse I mean that the rhetoric of development as a human
rightl will continue, without serious efforts at implementation.
Develooment will then be (or continue to be) a human rite: "new creations
will look very much like legal escapism, and refuge will he souoht in
solutions which are illusory."8 The danger is that a rather utopian
rhetoric, which so quickly fostered new concepts and a nascent movement,
will be absorbed into the rituals and routines of internstional
conferences and U.N. agencies. If the pessimists are correct, or even
partly correct, only a few countries display a consistent commitment to
human rights and to development. Most countries (including the major
powers) would thus be glad to leave the human rioht to development as
hortatory, as an ideal morality lacking enforceable legal standards.
This amounts to leaving it with international bureaucracies, which must
be presumed to be no more developed than their constituent states. These
bureaucracies often measure progress in terms of growing budgets and the
numbers of vague covenants, resolutions, and expert reports adopted. We
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have had Decades of Development and Disarmament, an International Women's
Year, etc. Why not stand in line behind the Years of Youth and Old Age
for an equally ineffective Decade (or Year) of the Right to Development?
Development agencies could continue to by and large ignore the domestic
political context of rights violations, in a rush to carry out programmes
comfortably within their traditions, and to stick to the "safe" social
and cultural issues.9 Philp Alston points out related dangers inherent
in this "structural" (international-level) approach:
[It may] become identified with a sweepingly
broad, non-legal, economically or
sociologically-oriented approacht Its impact then
would be to downplay the importance of other,
specifically legal, approaches to human rights
issues, to move , . . away from specifics towards
global economic problems, and generally "to
disappear into the clouds of a universality that
leaves the larger world stranded far below.l0
Regrettably, an international political development can never be
built upon the foundation of a severe national underdevelopment; the
bottleneck to implementing the human right to development is the
political underdevelopment of most constituent states.11 Negotiations
"for a new international order will require changes not only in relations
between states but also ... inside the industrialized states as well as
inside the Third World states.'i2 For "all but the poorest countries,"
John Weeks and Elizabeth Dore argue, "internal resources are more than
sufficient to successfully solve-the basic needs problems within a
reasonable time." The continuing failure to do this "is explained by the
structure of economic and political power in underdeveloped
countries."13 Numerous gaps and weak points in law and politics,
within and between nation-states and "higher" levels of political
organization, mean that the situation described by Weeks and Dore is
unlikely to change soon;14 sovereignty is jealously guarded precisely
because it is so frequently a pretense, a legal fiction flying in the
face of the economic and military dependence felt in varying degrees by
most First, Second and Third World countries. We thus seem to be at a
Machiavellian or "Grotian moment," a "time when an old system of World
order is unable to deal successfully with the challenges posed,1''i and
when extreme seif-reliance or a neo-mercantilism proves
self-impoverishing in an interdependent world.
Dealing with this "moment," keeping the human right to development
from becoming a cynically manipulative rite, requires that a healthy dose
of an almost Machiaveliian pragmatism be laid alongside the existing
utopianism, in preference to other approaches.1g Definitional "games,
logicized hierarchic constructs, positivistic inadequacies,
transcendental nonsense, and other inhibiting jurisprudential or
philosophic tendencies have left far too many scholars and
decision-makers without adequate tools for ... inquiry and choice about
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human rights."1 7 In a rush to applaud and extend rights, the fact that
rights violations have been declared impermissible is frequently mistaken
for the having and exercising of these rights by real people and their
groups. Their victory requires a lengthy political and legal process of
gestation and maturation. Having and exercising are inevitably limited
by conflicts with other rights, especially those rights which
governmental and economic elites arrogate to themselves. The right to
development-must therefore be defined in terms of empirical
justifications, demonstrations of the necessity of the right to achieving
the interests of its would-be violators. This right must attain broad
applicability through good faith attempts at an Ideological neutrality of
definition, and through its de minimus character. In the terms used by
Wesley Hohfeld, a multiplicity of duties correlate with the right to
development. These duties do not fall on all domestic and international
parties ecually, and they may be relaxed in light of absolute or relative
resource scarcities (including a lack of coercion and legitimacy relative
to need) or even violated on occasion.18 But if, on an independent
assessment, a protracted abuse of the right to development is the way an
uncreative regime chooses to rule, stern sanctions must be applied under
a new body of rules. The U.N.'s experience with South Africa suggests
that, as things stand, such a regime could be made uncomfortable, but
really effective sanctions reouire an international consensus.19 How
this can be achieved is discussed below.20
I. DOMESTIC UNDERDEVELOPIENT
Richard Falk poses an interesting question concerning rights
violations: "Why do smart people keep making stupid policies?21 I
think the answer is political underdevelopment, if we assume that rights
are not eternal verities but grants by particular elites for
predetermined purposes.22 These purposes will be described as
enhancing political stability, and strengthening the state by marshalling
whatever resources come to hand as such purposes are frecuently advanced
by policies favourable to rights. But even more frequently, particularly
during such crises as the perpetual states of emergency under which some
countries are ruled, rights violations are perceived to enhance stability
and strength. When'this hapoens, rights will be violated. Courts, if
they are consulted, and even international documents almost always
rubberstamp the political perceptions on which these violatilons are
based.23 Overreactions among leaders preoccupied with their own power
and dignity are virtually guaranteed, when events impair critical
faculties by inflaming passions. A mild setback becomes a grave menance
for a Nixon, a J. Edgar Hbover, and many a leader in the Third World --
where hardly a sparrow falls from a tree but what it is perceived to
endanger an unstable regime maneuvering within a weak state. The pursuit
of wea]th and/or power is perceived as a nasty, zero-sum game in the
short run; winners are seen to profit only at the expense of losers, who
frequently lose life as well as position. Political and constitutional
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development, on the other hand, involves a raising of the game stakes by
augmenting political and bureaucratic capabilities over time. But
improved capabilities mean more controllers (ultimately, an increased
political participation24), an eventuality opposed by the wealthy and
powerful whose relative positions will be eroded. The right to
development, or any other right, frequently gets lost in the game shuffle
because it is not perceived as providing a regime with something it can
use, such as legitimacy.25
A. Political Instability and Its Economic Consequences
The opportunity to exercise statesmanship is a precondition to
attaining many other goals. It requires but little power to capture the
state, relative to the massive power that the state can then exert on
your behalf. This is particularly true in the many Third World countries
where the state floats free of many socio-economic moorings, as an
enclave in the capital city. Intense competitions to capture such states
serve to dissipate political and economic resources: an enduring
coalition or entrenched power position is not the way a short-term,
zero-sum game is played. Dissipation means that such vital political
resources as coercion and legitimacy remain in short supply relative to
need; might does not make right and right does not make might, in what
might otherwise be a dialectic of effectiveness and validity.
Underdevelopment means that there is too little power and wealth, and too
few civil service jobs, to satisfy even the minimum demands of all elite
groups. Maneuverings within the existing political environment thus
cannot palliate the disputes that arise. A certain number of the
subsequent rebellions, coups, etc. will succeed, but levels of political
stability seldom change because the underlying conditions remain
unchanged. The time-honoured means of dealing with this political
underdevelopment is the politics of a paternalistic despotism, always
petty and sometimes benevolent, under a monarchial constitution (as
opposed to a constitutional monarchy). The monarch (sometimes termed
"President" or "Chairman of the ... Council" -- the monarchy is usually
too unstable to form the basis for a dynasty) is wistfully portrayed as
the fountainhead of ail legitimate power. The broadest possible notions
of State sovereignty are constantly reiterated in the face of an acute
foreign dependence.26
A monarchial constitution amounts to the father-child relationship
writ large; the "children" are not to question what is sought on their
behalf, under laws and institutions which do not merely act in loco
parentis but are direct manifestations of the parent's will. Leaders
seek to define their followers into "subjects," which is to say objects
of exploitation for benevolent or other purposes; into "the masses," an
undifferentiated lump which must be forced to see the coincidence of
interests between rulers and ruled; or into "public opinion," rulers'
attempts to bypass elite demands by purporting to represent inarticulate
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public desires (as in Nixon's "silent majority"). Balancing, more or
less rationally, the harms and benefits from these political
performances, the poor and powerless usually find these performances
seriously wanting. Their reactions, ranging from bemused apathy to open
rebellion, can become a significant cause for political instability when
a Lenin, a Juan Peron or a Huey Long comes to organize them as a
stepping-stone to power. If government and its rivals use terrorism and
the other artifacts of a penal politics, a "culture of fear" joins the
"culture of poverty" as prime constraints on the right to development.27
This political underdevelopment is mirrored in the two main types of
economic policies pursued in the Third World. Asbjorn-Eide appropriately
terms these "coercive dissociation" and "coercive submission."' Under
the latter,
governments of some Third World countries seek to
maintain...subordination to an unjust
international economic system, by making
extraction of its resources inexpensive and its
labour cheap. ET]he consequence is almost by
necessity a policy of labour repression and denial
of political participation in order to avoid
processes of democratisation. This ... creates
... concern by the governors with internal
security ... [which] becomes increasingly
difficult [to maintain] without external
support.'9
Avaricious local elites, having been easily coopted into a state of
dependence, are unwilling to have their privileges trimmed in the
interests of an equalisation and a greater self-reliance. A Green
Revolution through extension agents aggravates rural misery: more food
frequently means more for export only, and many peasants have to abandon
their land and culture or face harsh consequences. This market
liberalism of this "trickle down" has been far from liberal to the poor,
yet many argue today for increased "efficiency" in Third World economies,
and an international "management of interdependence" -- along with a few
attempts to correct some inequities. This amounts to an acceptance of
the present economic order, a making the best of such opportunities as
arise.30
Coercive dissociation, on the other hand,
is characterized by a centralized system of
government, an economic policy directed by a small
number of persons, aimed at the elimination of
existing linkages with the international economy
as well as a profound internal reorganization of
... production and ownership, but carried out in
rejection of general political participation,
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withou , the normal guarantees of the rule of
law...l
This autochthony has meant slightly larger slices for the poor and
powerless, but the pie remains desperately small or gets even smaller. A
"vanguard" party or (more commonly in recent years) military faction does
have perspectives which differ from the common people's perspective on
some things, but this elite can hardly be said to have a more "advanced
consciousness.,'32 As Reginald Green argues, a Marxian call for
centralized national revolutions, so as to permit changes in Third World
peripheries, is no less arrogant, Eurocentric and neo-colonial than its
bourgeois counterpart; to ignore tne constraints on the transition to
socialism posed by limited production resources in the Third World (the
"base") is to revert from materialism to idealism.33
The Cold War of the 1950's and 1960's, now making a comeback,
obscured such higher ideals as.development and.human rights, and fostered
macro-economic growth policies and assertions of a political sovereignty
at the expense of other aspects of self-determination. External threats
and superpower rivalries are exaggerated, in an attempt to hide failings
in domestic and international policies. Strategies of dissociation and
submission alike share a coercive character and the denial of political
participation. Under them, ruling elites experience grave difficulties
while forcing their conception of development on the populace;
governments propose but the people dispose (as Antony Allott says
somewhere), such as by grumbling and turning in a mediocre economic
performance. Self-realization, the essence of a right to development
variously defined, cannot be attained by the Invisible Hand - especially
when there are thumbs on the scale -- or by following in the wake of
another's (secular) consciousness.34
B. The Soft State and Another Development
Jim Paul notes that, "irrespective of official ideology, the power of
the state over prices and incomes, communications, land, tools and
technology, educational heaIth and agricultural services, nutrition and
housing is very broad.'" 5 How, then, can we speak of Myrdai's "soft
state," which is admittedly far from soft on the poor and powerless?36
The answer is that the state and its bureaucracy may be strong compared
to many other organized elements in society, yet weak in terms of its
ability to provide the services demanded by increasingly urbanized and
sophisticated publics. A major reason for low levels of governmental
legitimacy, and hence foc poiticai instability in the Third World, is
that politicians have littie long-term bargaining power. Bargaining
presupposes a state strong enough to provide the public with services
that will be bartered for public loyalty. The main political purpose
behind successful bargaining is augmenting the state's "penetration,"
that.is, extending scate authority into satraps of urban opposition and
the vast rural "outback." Penetration increases tax collections and
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chances that government will be obeyed in other respects. But the
instability of the zero-sum political game means that the royal road to
the strong state is frequently blocked in the Third World. Bureaucrats
cannot gain power as a group and at the expense of the public rather than
of senior politicians or each other.37
In all countries, the public evaluates the legitimacy of a particular
segment of the bureaucracy on the basis of gains and losses flowing from
its programs, as well as on general notions of administrative fairness
and competence. Commonly in the Third World, the public's contacts with
a bureaucracy perceived as venal and parasitic (in the sense that it
consumes much more than it produces) almost always lead to hprm rather
than benefit. Administrative programs are new and constantly uprooted.
Bureaucrats behave like unspecialised courtiers arrayed in concentric
circles around a "throne;" staff-and-line hierarchies and notions of a
legal-rational legitimacy prove all but irrelevant in practice.
Rapid-fire personnel transfers frustrate the formation of cliques which
endanger political stability, and also frustrate consistent policy
implementation, the development of expertise, and the kinds of
organizational loyalty that constitute legitimacy within a
bureaucracy.38
This perpetuation of soft states in the Third World, and an
unwillingness and inability to implement development and human rights
efforts from the top downwards, have led some theorists to suoest
alternative development approaches, to Another Development.39 " These
"bottom-up" strategies are deeply anarchistic,40 in that they seek to
circumvent the state and to manipulate gaps or weak points in state power
through a self-managed mobilization and organization of the poor. These
strategies appeal to those pragmatic perpetuators of anarchism, peasants
*who have not become too demoralized, Westernised or collectivised. Some
local autonomy in development efforts is obviously needed to take
advantage of traditional practices, and to counter the top heaviness and
coerciveness of policies of a submission or a dissociation. Advocates of
Another Development are clearly correct when they argue, in effect, that
the economic surplus cannot be captured by the poor and powerless for
their own purposes unless the "political surplus" is abolished or
redistributed, at least at the local level. But, like anarchism and many
other valuable doctrines of social reconstruction, Another Development
flounders at the point of actually dismantling or restructuring the Dower
of a state which bristles at the slightest derogation of Its privileges.
Indeed, to succeed in this effort is to become the problem: a
revolutionary state which cannot advance political development or avoid
repression in the face of elitist enemies -- as Lkranian and Catalonian
anarchists (and American followers of Cesar Chavez) found out. Aoain
like anarchism, Another Development has not yet devised alternative ways
to organize mass consumption and production, by large-scale industries
needing a central direction. A rather romantic, backward-lookino society
of artisans and peasants seems to be what theorists of Another
Development, and anarchism, have in mind. Another Development may thus
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foster the effective pursuit of development by particular groups yet
leave untouched the equally important right of all to live in a
developing society.41
Many of the ambiguities in the Another Development approach are
highlighted when the role of law gets discussed. Yash Ghai offers a
useful introduction:
During the colonial period there was a series of
protest movement which sought to set up their own
alternative institutions based, unlike those of
the colonial regime, on wide participation and
democratic practices. They pursued political,
economic and social welfare objectives, seeking a
high degree of self-reliance and autonomy. In
both their political and economic aims they were
perceived to run counter to the policies of the
colonial state, and were thus harrassed and
suppressed. In such a situation, it may be
possible to use the law to challenge the
oppressive action of the authorities -- often
possible because of the contradictions of the
liberal legal order (or the ideology and to some
extent the rules of which the colonial state,
despite its authoritarianism, partakes), The
strategy of turning the law of a state against
itself can operate, however, only in a very
restricted way.42
In "a very restricted way" should be underlined, when we evaluate these
strategies as potential means for implementing the human right to
development. Ever since the end of a formal colonialism, "the liberal
legal order" has very much receded and been replaced by an
authoritarianism in and beyond law. Much of governance is carried out
under what is a martial law in substance, and often in name as well.
Laws and decisions resembling military orders (a congenial state of
affairs for the many military regimes, of course) are specific yet far
from precise, and they have no necessary connection one to another. It
is as though more law automatically signifies more order. So chaotic a
body of rules leaves unchecked a significant perpetuator of
underdevelopment: incoherent and arbitrary political and administrative
decisions. Action is inescapably demanded without fo'mal legal
authorization, and legally-mandated acts are ignored for reasons of
inertia or political convenience. Cynicism and indifference toward law
as a means of control or change breed among politicians, bureaucrats, and
the public, all of whom see yawning gaps between law and practice.43
These gaps can be exploited under strategies of Another Development
only to a very limited extent; the gaps are quickly filled by new laws,
administrative action or the barrel of a gun wielded with few
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compunctions by a regime perceiving itself under threat. The odds are
always strongly against a victory had by invoking normal procedures in a
legal system strongly biased against the poor, while appearing before a
compromised judiciary during what frequently seem to be states of
emergency. We should not jump to the conclusion that legal advocates of
Another Development know better than the people they would serve: "It is
common knowledge that the majority of Kenyan citizens [for example] want
nothing to do with official iaw."' In any event, there is "little
doubt" that the human rights tradition is more consistent with
"top-heavy" development strategies, where rights and duties can be
defined more easily and enforced more readily.45
II. THE QUEST FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS
The International whole is, unfortunately, no greater than the sum of
its parts; the incoherence, cynicism and indifference described above -
shorn of some authoritarian trappings - also characterises the
underdeveloped international legal system. The international "state" is
so weak that Max Weber's lecal-rational legitimacy can seldom be
discerned. Leaders contest for control over definitions of concepts
perceived as crucial to shaping the future, and there are thus no
agreed-on definition of rights and duties, implementation strategies, or
even topics for research. This is especially so for the collective
("third generation") rights embodied in Covenants which many states have
yet to ratify: rights to development, self-determination, peace, and a
safe environment. The right to development reflects an ongoing movement
away from a passive co-existence under international law, and towards an
active cooperation. The formal equality of states in their economic
dealings, and "neutral" rules and procedures for resolving disputes, are
being further eroded by those who feel the urgency of this right.46
The opinion of Rene-Jean Dupuy in the Texaco/Libya arbitration47
reflects the tensions that have resulted: Article 2 of the Economic
Charter48 "must be analyzed as a political, rather than as a legal,
declaration concerned with the ideological strategy of development and,
as such, supported only by non-industrialized states." The reality of
relations between states is that solidarity remains a myth and "the
egoism of national interest predominates.'4 9 Even so, a human rights
violation is no longer so consistently a victimless international crime.
Individuals can sometimes gain an audience, if not a remedy, for claims
which were purely internal matters until very recently.50
A. The Problem Sketched
Some experts, such as Peter Mutharika, find the international law of
development to consist largely of bilateral and multilateral agreements
and investment transaction formats; others, such as Abi-Saob, stress
- 34 -
emerging principles of entitlement based on need, new standards of
compensation for expropriation, and North-South negotiation and
consultation procedures.51 Both views are correct, since each validly
describes a lex specialis. George Schwarzenberger calls these
"international Quasi-orders," which exist alongside such ideological or
utopian international pseudo-orders as laissez-faire liberalism, Marxian
world revolution52 and, presumably, the right to development. Despite
universalist aspirations, none of these orders can become the order.
This is because of deep disagreements over the content and consequences
of rights. To summarize briefly,-political and civil ("first
generation") rights have Stoic, Christian, and Roman law roots, but are
usually traced to American and French revolutionary pronouncements.
"Second generation" economic and social rights are grounded in a very
different tradition begun with the Russian Revolution. The "third
generation" of, for example, the right to development is a de novo
product of the ongoing experience of decolonialization.53
Each of these three sets of rights forms a successively-overlapping
layer, without much depth or interpenetration, imposed on a rather
reluctant international "consciousness." Each has its own covenants and
resolutions, and its own, frequently self-satisfied, sloganeers. Demands
for particular rights, and claims that they have been fulfilled, arise in
diverse and shifting ideological and socio-economic contexts. Clearly,
no progress can be made at the international level unless there are
legitimate ways to compare Haiti's human rights performance with Cuba's,
or Nicaragua's with El Salvador's. How can this be done? The best (but
nevertheless imperfect) answer is that evaluations should encompass all
commonly-asserted rights -- a conflation of the Covenants, if you will --
particularly American-style "negative rights enforced by regularized
grievance procedures" and Soviet-style "positive rights implemented by a
system of administrative support."'54 In the end, evaluations can
attain an ideological neutrality only if everyone's ox gets gored, if
each theory of rights is admitted as a partly valid insight. 55
B. Exercises in Consensus-Building
Initially, the right to development requires us to consider the
performance of polities in the Third World. The widely-respected
criteria elaborated in Gunnar Myrdal's Asian Drama56 can hardly be
improved upon for this purpose. But thoughtful criteria suggested by
Barrington Moore's Reflections on the Cause of Human Misery / are even
more useful, when evaluations are expanded to include countries in the
First and Second Worlds. Moore's criteria differ from those associated
with the human riaht to development in one crucial respect: instead of
struggling with conflict-provoking definitions of social justice, Moore
proceeds to define injustices -- concepts around which a consensus almost
seems to form by itself. This is because it "is easier to condemn
particular practices as unjust than to produce an articulate and
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convincing concept of the just."' 5 8 Gut reactions can be taken into
account, yet the sense cf injustice -- reactions to painful experiences
without justification -- is fairly objective and universal: "The
experience of living in society produces in human beings a distinction
between legitimate and illegitimate authority."'59 Victims "generally
resent what is done to them and ... would rarely concede that, because
such behavior is common in their country, their tormentors are acting
quite properly."60 In particular, there is a tendency to self-defense
against arbitrary abuses of authority, to compel authorities to listen to
grievances arising when expectations are violated, and to remove
sometimes violently, institutional obstacles to social justice.61
While they may quarrel over human rights definitions, people
everywhere are almost uniformly scandalized and their passions aroused
when a government exacerbates or does nothing to ameliorate human
miseries. Moore generalises these miseries, "hardly ever really enjoyed"
for their own sake, into four species or categories of roughly eaual
importance: poverty, hunger and disease; oppressive socio-economic '
rel ations; governmental persecution for dissident beliefs; and war, in
both its conventional and guerrilla forms.62 I argue that a broad
consensus would most easily form around a human right to development
defined as the progressive amelioration of these miseries. This
definition seems to convert negative rights into positive rights, and
vice versa, a possibly useful way to "shake up" a debate long grown
stale. Under Moore's criteria, the legal essence of liberal democracy,
the Rule of Law as traditionally defined, prefers freedom from
governmental persecution to the amelioration of poverty, hunger, disease,
and oppressive socio-economic relations.63 A Marxian socialist
legality reverses these preferences while asserting a series of what are
.largely non-justiciable rights.64 Advocates of the human right to
development can properly gore the oxen of both sides evenhandedly:
"Freedom of speech without social justice may become freedom to die from
hunger. Material satisfaction without freedom of expression and creative
innovation may result in spiritual starvation or death in a welfare
prison.65
The progressive amelioration of Moore's species of misery is a viable
goal (difficult but far from impossible to achieve) to set for regimes,
if they are assisted by a saner international order. It would reouire
that everybody be more creative economically, however. Many rights
advocates seem to have somethino like this in mind: "a drift ... toward
an international welfare state"6 6 where richer people and states help
the poorer, under a synthesis of some elements from the- radical critiQue
of existing development efforts and of liberals' views of world economy.
A few words of caution are in order; we know that few of even the
prosperous states are organized to fulfill basic needs properly, 2nd that
European states attempting to combine the best of liberal democratic and
socialist models sometimes (at least) wind up with the worst of both
worlds. No state has yet meaningfully and consistently implemented
welfare "rights." Wh3t has happened is that the public exchanged
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individual political rights, perceived as often illusory or irrelevant,
for the individual (and a few group) economic rights that usually turn
out to be equally illusory. This is not development, and the only things
certain to happen are that "welfare" states will get stronger and assert
their own, bureaucratic, interests more effectively. In any event, it
seems unlikely that international bureaucracy could ever become an
efficient and effective Earth Mother, holding the cornucopia of her
"socialised" people. On an international "dole," underdeveloped
countries could expect the same kind of second-class legal citizenship
experienced by domestic welfare recipients, a denial of equal protection
by laws reifying inequalities.67
What the human right to development (the amelioration of Moore's
miseries) thus seems to require is the fostering of social democracies,
properly defined6 8 to circumvent the welfare state problems sketched
above. Such a strategy might command an international consensus, after
an adroit and lengthy sales effort. The constraints on ameliorating the
Third World underdevelopment described above6 9 are the same as those
constraining further development, movement toward genuine social
democracy, in the First and Second worlds: a paucity of economic and
other resources needed to support and enforce a socio-economic
equalisation and genuine welfare measures, a failure of will among
leaders preoccupied with their short-term political survival, and a
bureaucracy manifestly incapable of assuming additional "service" tasks
efficiently and effectively.7 0 Seeking change of such magnitudes would
amount to attempting a grand, new social contract in each country, to
replace Locke's theoretical construct. Such an attempt failed under
Britain's Wilson/Callaghan Government, and failed again under postulates
of the new Social Democratic Party. But this does not mean that more
.imaginative and competent attempts would not suceed, perhaps with
negotiations and guarantees undertaken by the international community.
Even then, problems would remain. No legal regime (liberal, socialist or
social democratic) has succeeded in eliminating public apathy, the
subtler forms of a petty despotism, or the fissiparous tendencies that
supply the temptations to terrorism and guerrilla war. All systems fail
to deal creatively with the dilemma apparent in, for example, race
relations and welfare debates in the West; the "private" goals of liberty
and the "collectivist" goals of equality seem mutually exclusive at many
junctures.71
A pragmatic way around this dilemma, as old as philosophy itself, and
around my rather utopian advocacy of a strict social democracy, is to
conclude that, as many polities have made little or no progress in
ameliorating any of Moore's categories of misery, their citizens have
little to lose. We should thus applaud progress towards eliminating any
one category.7 2 This is a useful way to proceed, to allow for national
divergences of ideologies and economic policies in areas where consensus
is most difficult to achieve, once we dispose of a caveat which usually
proves specious. Progress towards eliminating any species cf misery is
frequently asserted to have its opportunity costs, particularly the loss
- 37 -
of liberty to gain more equality. Violations are then rationalized by
labelling human rights notions as "Western," "socialist" or "colonial,"
depending on which ideological aversion is practiced. A reluctance to
condemn even gross and persistent violations by countries in your own
region follows, lest you be condemned in return.73 Given the
international dissensus over rights, there was no good rebuttal to this
strategy, until the human right to development came along. As an effort
by "them" to judge "us" from a Third World perspective, the human right
to development invites "us" to judge "them" in return; a country is in an
awkward position when soliciting foreign help while at the same time
rejecting foreign models.
It is now more difficult for a leader to relegate foreign complaints
about his or her rights violations to the ash-heap of a cultural or moral
imperialism. (This is really an invitation to adopt the
seemingly-eniightened and tolerant relativism of an armchair
anthropologist, an invititation to mask one's feelings of moral/cultural
superiority by failing to object to rights violations.) The single most
valuable facet of the conflated human right to development is that it
reduces what is frequently a specious justification and a false dichotomy
to its true proportions: it is no longer necessary, and frequently no
longer possible, to choose between human rights and development. 74 The
way a former Senator from the Philippines deals with the matter is worth
quoting at length:
Two justifications for authoritarianism in Asian
developing countries are currently fashionable.
One is that Asian societies are authoritarian and
paternalistic and so need governments that are
also authoritarian and paternalistic; that Asia's
hungry masses are too concerned with providing
their families with food, clothing, and shelter,
to concern themselves with civil liberties and
political freedoms; that the Asian conception of
freedom differs from that of the West; that, in
short, Asians are not fit for democracy.
Another is that developing countries must
sacrifice freedom temporarily to achieve the rapid
economic deveiopment that their exploding
populations and rising expectations demand; that
in short, government must be authoritarian to
promote development.
The first justification is racist nonsense. The
second is a lie: authoritarianism is not needed
for developing; it is needed to perpetuate the
status quo.75
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To elaborate on the Senator's last point, the right to devejozpment
makes it easier to distinguish "reason of state" justifications'0
(bolstered by natural law rationalizations for many centuries) from the
evanescent and more capricious justifications of the ruler of the
moment. Taking the troubie to rebut justifications is an extremely
important task for, as H.L.A. Hart tells us, any society using the idea
of rights (having signed on for the human right to development, for
example) also recognizes justifications for violating those rights.
David Sidorsky offers a telling illustration: Persons "employed as guards
in an unjust system a,, understand ..., as do their employers, that they
-have a moral right to extra pay for overtime if it had been promised
them."77 The pragmatic question then becomes how guards' and
employers' perceptions can be changed, how the guard's sense of injustice
can be expanded into a reflection on the prisoner's plight in a little
more just, unjust prison. This amounts to forcing an examination of
which considerations count as justifications for rights violations. By
disposing of many such considerations, the right to development has
altered the burden of proof'8 -- a favorite lawyers' concept - on
rights violations. If, for example, we are told that "You must break
eggs to make an omelette," the right to development makes us feel more
entitled to ask: "Why is that metaphor relevant?" and "Show us the
omelette, if you really did make it. What's so good about it?" 79
We have come a long way towards a conceptual consensus. If (as
Barrington Moore notes) factual evidence and logic about rights are
sound, the moral starting point piays a minor role and can even be
reversed.: "if the general arguments are correct, presumably anyone who
wished to increase human suffering would find the discussion
pertinent,"80 The "general arguments" are now pretty clear:
No persuasive evidence has been advanced that
basic civil and political rights need to be
derogated or sacrificed to meet essential human
needs. The concept that economic growth is the
indispensible prerequisite to political and civil
rights has not been bcrne out in practice.
Governments that ruthlessly suppress ... rights,
even on the pretext of achieving some economic
purpose, are seldom predisposed at a later date to
restore these same rights. ... Injustice feeds on
injustice ....81
If independent observers place the burden of proof on leaders who
argue that it is necessary and effective to abridge one category of
(misery-ameliorating) rights to expand those in another category, few
politicians in the Third World or elsewhere could satisfy this
burden.82 There are a few loose ends to this argument, 8 ' but great
progress couid be made by giving this burden of proof a practical
significance and by coercing the more extreme deviants.
- 39 -
III. A PRAGMATIC WAY FORWARD
The human right to development teaches that the only way to resolve
the liberty/equaity dilemma is through development: the upward movement
of the whole society along the lines described by Myrdal, including
fairly rapid reductions of the percentages in the most disadvantaged
categories,8 4 We know that such a policy is fiendishly difficult to
devise and implement, but isn't it open to the more fundamental objection
that politicians and bureaucrats have too few incentives to even attempt
it? The answer is no, if we focus on the enlightened self-interest of
politicians and bureaucrats. Admittedly, their altruism is often
limited, and their self-interest is frequently narrow and occupies short
time horizons, reflecting limited capacities as well as an understandable
desire for survival in office. The maintenance of an order backed oy
threats (the traditional concern of positivism in an underdeveloped
jurisprudence) is perceived to be of such overwhelming importance that a
enuine effort is required to stand back from day-to-day preoccupations,
n order to ponder the longer-term policies associated with the human
right to development. Paradoxically, a regime strong and stable enough
to ensure a leader's survival in office in at least the short run, the
capacity to deal with the most pressing of crises, is the first step (but
no more than that) to the right to development. Prudence and moderation
will then replace overreaction progressively, as (sane) politicians
become more and more preoccupied with the longer-term survival of their
regime and with their place in history.85
A. Domestic Pragmatism
The hard fact is that progress toward the human right to development
presupposes a certain level of political development; the Amins and Pol
Pots can be overthrown but not otherwise made to conform with humane
international standards. Even after this level is achieved, a certain
amount of backsliding -- smart people making stupid policies -- will
occur as leaders react to misperceived threats and advantages. I have
stressed the effects that perceptions have on policy86 because
perceptions can be changed over time, through a patient educational
process. This process would include strategic doses of coercion, if
necessary and availabie. Many non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
such as the Argentinian Center for Legal and Social Studies formed by
lawyers and families of "disappeared" persons and the Consumer
Association of Penang (Malaysia), attempt to educate politicians,
bureaucrats and the public in this fashion.8 7 These efforts also
progress at the international level, and strong international federations
of NGO's would further these efforts mackediy.88 Withdrawais of
support and the threat of rebellion by publics made aware of "their"
rights reinfcrce these teaChings, among politicians who have something to
lose. As a black American Abolitionist, Frederick Douglass, argued in
1857, "power concedes notning w,thout a demand .... Find out just what
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people will submit to and you have found the exact amount of injustice
and wrong which will be imposed on
them ....89
Twentieth century politics is characterized by, above all else,
,numerous demands made by elites (and other segments of the public), which
ere often babked by threats. Politicians and bureaucrats aware of their
self-interest will seek to grant as many of these demands as the level of
development permits, perhaps in a cynically manipulative fashion. This
will occur unless the use of naked coercion by the regime's opponents "so
severely undermines ... the authority of the regime itself that it is
difficult ... to change policy in response to such tactics without
compromising their [the rulers'] position entirely."'90 If rulers
perceive the polity to be strong and stable enough to cope with these
threats, as they perceive them, elite and public demands will be
granted. This serves to align the "is" and "ought" of human rights
through a dialectical process: the daily exercise of power in ways
designed to legitimate, and thus to strengthen, that power.91
It is at this point, ensuring that demands for the right to
development are made and heard, that Another Development strategies can
play a crucial role by offering a voice to the voiceless. Along lines
described by Paulo Friere, a self-taught awareness of basic needs can
lead to the mobilization of the poor and powerless that often results in
confrontation and struggle. As Richard Falk puts it: "It is the world's
dissidents, the resistance movements, and the human rights actors,
especially those independent of state power, that are creating
possibilities for change and the basis for hope. '92 Unfortunately, a
conceptual and political gap opens up: isolated demands and their
satisfaction are not institutionalized for the whole society's benefit:
independent initiatives do not add up to a macro force for change. Such
a force would inevitably display a centralising tendency frightening to
grass-roots movements which are frequently content with their
small-scale progress.§3 I would argue that this gap can be partly
filled by utilising the concept of legitimacy, the importance of which is
stressed in this article.94 If pursuing the right to development
becomes pivotal to a regime's legitimacy, a backsliding toward
underdevelopment can be retarded -- ultimately in the interests of the
rulers as well as the ruled.95 An illustration is given below.96
B. An International Pragmatism
There seems to be a clear moral in all of this for international law
and policy. More specific and forcefuland more ideologically neutral,
descriptions of what the right to development "ought" to entail in a
particular country are indeed possible. Such criteria should be based
upon more thorough determinations of what that situation actually "is,"
and extensively informed by careful assessments of what "can" be done to
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improve development Prospects.97 A programmatic yet realistic policy
should be the aim, one which is the best attainable under existing and
reasonably forseeable levels of development in a country -- but no more
demanding than that. Such an aim might serve to excuse marginal
violations by petty despots, but the need to avoid the frustrations of
attempting to attain a too-demanding standard is a more compelling policy
consideration. Success will ultimately turn on the degree of commitment
to a sensible development strategy rather than on the level of
development currently obtaining, once a country has reached the threshold
where pursuit of theiright to development becomes possible. Nothing very
elaborate should be attempted; the obligations generated by a few
critical rights -- to food, work and health care, for example -- should
be identified, along with more difficult determinations of who is
responsible for meeting these obligations nationally and
internationally. The international community should then carefully
monitor performance under these criteria, and act on trends toward or
away from the right to development.98
Non-governmental organizations, such as Amnesty International, the
International Commission of Jurists, and Partnership for Productivity,
are ideally suited to act as monitors. These NGO's have managed to avoid
the bureaucratisation and politicisation of U.N. agencies. While I have
argued that the focal point of activity must be the nation-state,
international NCO watchdogs can supplement efforts there from a broader
base, educating politicians' self-interested choices and engaging in a
planning to advance rights rather than merely responding to violations
with an inspired ad hoc-ery. NGOs can promote grass-roots organizations
more freely than can U.N. agencies. Details Of what is happening in an
unaccessible outback, and of how national legal systems are actual±y
functioning, can be (and are) collected and passed aiong in an expanoed
NGO network, along with descriptions of workable strategies. NGOs could
even mediate between nations and between a nation and U.N. organs, so as
to realize small gains from the human right to development quickly and in
the most urgent areas. These tasks would require a greatly increased
funding for NGOs, of course, but it would be money best spent. 99 The
whole effort wouid be one of taking rights seriously in the literal
sense, of taking constitutions, five-year plans, political speeches, etc.
at face value, and thus trying to make rhetoric over into reality. This
is the relatively unobjectionable strategy of trying to make a regime's
legitimacy turn on criteria it has itself selected.
There is also a darker side to international efforts. While the
right to development (more precisely, the NIEO) holds out the promise
that more of the economic surplus will accumulate in Third World
countries,OO pragmatists caution that this would require the
redistribution of an international "political surplus". This requires
reductions in the duelling by muscle-bound economic royaiists that is a
chronic cause of political instability and of wasteful military
expenditures. A friendly bargaining for First and Second World support
of the right to development would require a lessening of North-South and
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East-West tensions. Barring this rather unlikely eventuality, domestic
and international NGO efforts will dominate. The U.N. should
nevertheless try to come up with new rules of the game, designed to limit
bad faith bargaining tactics and to ensure a more reliable fulfilling of,
expectations, As things stand internationally, Third World countries are
left to capitaiise on what are largely negative (non-developmental)
resources: dependency, demography, threats to acquire nuclear weapons,
withdrawal.of purchasing power, and menancing with revolution or
counter-revolution. There is some room to maneuver, for developed
countries have the power but are increasingly unable to guarantee order;
the room is limited, however, by the challengers' lack of the power to
create the New Order by themselves.1O1
Can we cheer ourselves with the thought that this unpromising
material holds the reasonable prospect of an international poiitical
development, guided by law?. Yes, perhaps; international law does develop
in response to need, and the need for something like the right to
development is growing more painfully obvious to increasing numbers of
leaders. Much more work is needed than is commonly imagined, however.
Conceptual troubles have been stored up, as a result of the tendencies to
equate a diffuse human dignity with human rights, to equate declarations
of the impermissibility of violations with the concrete exercise of
rights, and for a rhetorical ethics to run so far ahead of anemic legal
rules as to lose touch with concrete international processes.
Politically, the risks of this development as a human rite are confusion
and the dilution of rights already issognized.102 These tendencies are
not completely new: Roland Pennock u notes that Article 25 of the
1948 Universal Declarationl04 stated that "everyone has the right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and
his family." This "well-being" is so vague a right as to be
indistinguishable from an interest.
Philip Alstonl05 finds the essence of the 1979 Secretary-General's
Reportl06 to be such optimistically vague ethical themes as justice,
fairness, soiidarity, interdependence, reparation for past exploitation,
and the maintenance of peace. These kinds of precepts have been termed
pr&-droit, par-droit, peri-droit and the normes sauvaoes that some wish
to annihilate and others to domesticate. Continuing in a French law
vein, we might more charitably but legitimately describe documents
dealing with the right to development as "organic laws" -- the effect of
which depends upon more specific statutes. Such statutes would remedy a
lex imperfecta by imposing concrete duties on particular parties, duties
correlative to the rights which-are being created. Important sources of
these duties would be the duties laid on rulers and individuals by the
customs, scriptures, etc. of many societies, duties which have not
hitherto been correlated with the particular rights of particular
parties.l07 Sohn describes the lengthy procedures involved:
As it happened in the United States and many other
countries, vague constitutional precepts have been
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translated by general agreementof states into
more detailed principles, which, because of their
higher precision, import a more definite character
to the whole international legal order. At the
same time, the limits of autointerpretation are
narrowed sesi0a
Autointerpretation is the legal form of the international political
underdevelopment that can be expected to retard this process
substantially, although we are rather optimistically told that domestic
jurisdiction is a residual concept or another way of saying that
international law does not appiy.±09 It is certainly true that:
"Sovereignty may be a shield, against officious external meddling; it was
not fashioned to be a sword against a nation's own people."'i O -But
that is frequently its use, a use dictated by a domestic political
underdevelopment. D'Amato thus expresses the reality of jurisdiction and
implies the hope of effective action: "The human rights violator is, like
the pirate, hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind, and
jurisdiction to punish his violations is universal."'i i If punishment
were to become a reality, the likes of Amin, Samoza, and the Shah might
be deterred by lack of a subsequent place to hide.
C. Academics' Roles
The right to development has been taken up by a "movement" with
radically new priorities and programmes. The-movers have been
politicians, a few bureaucrats, and, above all, the activists who are
frequently dissidents in their own countries. But academics Qua
academics also have important roles to play, in devising badly-needed
theories of the right to development. As soon as efforts go beyond the
promulgation of vague covenants and resolutions, the tendency is to use a
praxis which is nominally based on Third World needs but which draws
inspiration from the Eurocentric. radical traditions that are frequently
irrelevant to those needs. For example, this praxis is sometimes
associated with a "struggle jurisprudence." Struggle is vital to
advancing the right to development, but it has its limitations for the
poor and powerless who frequently lose the "struggle" as means to the
ends of others. This is precisely the outcome that the richt to
development seeks to avoid. A right to development praxis has run so far
ahead of meagre philosophical foundations, and even of a sense of
direction, that a floundering about is increasingly evident. Theory has
hitherto consisted of a simple summation of particular theories of rights
and of develcpment, without adequate attention to contradictions or
efforts to make the right to development greater than the sum of these
parts.li2 This article is perhaps the best evidence of such a
tendency, the result of making do with the best I could find.
Activists are said to be too busy to reflect upon theory. While
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academics have the time to reflect, they also tend to become passive in
the company of activists and reluctant to question the assumptions
underlying human rights. Such a questioning should now go forward;
increased consensus would, in fact, result if political arguments could
be converted into an intellectual dialogue, into ideas and ideals with
the power to move people. Behind all claims to rights are beliefs about
the nature of persons, groups, markets and governments. These beliefs
have yet tobe rigorously described and defended for the right to
development, so as to provide a sense of direction and to rebut
justifications for rights violations effectively.1 13 I have offered
descriptions which build upon Barrington Moore's species of human
misery;114 other formulations are clearly possible. Different sets of
entitlements for each society could be elaborated along lines suggested
by John Rawls' Theory of Justice,1 15 divested of its many
Americanisms. If this is thought too paternalistic, entitlements can be
defined by local people themselves, under elaborated canons of Another
Development. Beyond a justifying of rights to their would-be violators
-- as essential to their political well-being -- the most important task
is to give these precepts a legal legitimacy. Lawyers are certainly
needed as right-to-development advocates, educators, mobilizers,
planners, and law reformers. But their most important tasks at present
are to be critics of the right to development and creators of its
(pragmatic) jurisprudential framework.116 Jose Zalaauett has devised
useful lists of many of the components necessary to such a theory.ll7
Most of the answers to questions about the right to development can
be found by students of comparative law and politics. Much could be
learned
from case studies comparing countries in which
large-scale violations of human rights take place
with countries with similar economic and social
conditions where such violations do not occur.
While the causes for oppression and tyranny are
often clear for all to see, it is equally clear
that those very conditions sometimes do not
produce comparable results in other countries.ll8
What precise effect do different economic policies have on political
rights, and vice versa, in various countries -- a subject on which much
nonsense has been written and more spoken? Why do CouPs occur in some
countries, and not in others which seem to face similar conditions? What
are the roots of political violence, and why do different people and
different societies react to violence in such seemingly-different ways?
Flow have countries fared under different degrees of integration into the
international economy? What makes for a self-realization in different
societies, and why does it so often seem to escape the people and the
more developed societies pursuing it? Above all, what, if anything,
serves to legitimate (help to stabilize and strengthen) a polity, and how
can this be manipulated to accommodate the right to development? The aim
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would be to correlate rights with national circumstances, and to predict
what changes will accompany changed circumstances. In this way,
constraints on. the right to development and feasible policy choices could
be identified.ll
These are very large questions for a research agenda, but no larger
than the topic seems to require. A domestic or international
"constitutional law is mainly juristic theories of politics and
economics,''i20 so it is essential for lawyers to get their theories
exactly right while attempting to constitute the right to development.
Development as a human rite is so depressing a prospectl2i in the face
of so much promise that an uplifting conclusion from Andrei Sakharov
seems appropriate:
The ideology of human rights is probably the only
one which can be combined with such diverse
-ideologies as communism, social democracy,
religion, technocracy, and those ideologies which
may be described as national and indigenous. It
can also serve as a foothold for those who do not
wish to be aligned with theoretical intricacies
and dogmas and who have tired of the abundance of
ideologies, none of which have brought mankind a
simple happiness.
The defense of human rights is a clear path,
towards the unification of people in our turbulent
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